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"CHILDREN SHOULD BE SEEN AND NOT HEARD":
DO CHILDREN SHED THEIR RIGHT TO FREE SPEECH
AT THE SCHOOLHOUSE GATE?*
JUSTICE MARY MUEHLEN MARING*
This afternoon I would like to give you the historical background
of First Amendment law and student speech as it has evolved from Tinker
v. Des Moines (1969) to Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier (1988).
I. STUDENT POLITICAL EXPRESSION IS "CLOSELY AKIN TO
'PURE SPEECH"'
The United States Supreme Court held nearly sixty years ago that
students in public schools have First Amendment rights.' However, the
modern era of free speech in the public school context was ushered in
with Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District in
1969.2 In December 1965, a group of adults and students held a
meeting at a private home and decided to publicize their objections to
the Vietnam War by wearing black armbands during the holiday season. 3
John F. Tinker, fifteen years old; his sister, Mary Beth Tinker, thirteen
years old; Christopher Eckhart, sixteen years old; and their parents
decided to participate. 4 The principals of Des Moines public schools
became aware of the plan to wear armbands, and on December 14, 1965,
adopted a policy that any student wearing an armband to school would
be asked to remove it, and if he refused, he would be suspended until he
returned without the armband. 5
* This piece is an edited and annotated transcript of the speech Justice Mary Muehlen Maring de-
livered for the Freedom Lecture Series, sponsored by the F-M Communiversity's Freedom Lectureship
Fund and the League of Women Voters, at Concordia College in Moorhead, Minnesota, on March 1,
1998.
** Justice, North Dakota Supreme Court. The author wishes to express her appreciation to her
former law clerk, Aaron Dorrheim, and her current law clerk, Paul Odegaard, for their assistance in
preparing this speech for publication.
1. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 US. 624, 637 (1943) (holding that a state-
law requiring students to pledge allegiance to the American flag violates the First Amendment). The
Court in Barnette concluded that schools must protect "Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we
are not to strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to discount important principles of our
government as mere platitudes." Id.
2. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). Tinker was the "first real occasion" in which the Supreme Court ruled
on the issue of free speech under the First Amendment as it relates to students in elementary and
secondary schools. See generally Richard S. Vacca & H.C. Hudgins, Jr., Student Speech and the First
Amendment: The Courts Operationalize the Notion of Assaultive Speech, 89 Ed. LAW REP. 1, 2 (1994).
3. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 504 (1968).
4. Id.
5. Id. at 504.
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On December 16, 1965, Mary Beth and Christopher wore black arm-
bands to their schools and John wore his the next day. 6 They were all
sent home and told not to return until they came back without their arm-
bands. 7 The children did not return until after New Year's Day, after the
planned period for wearing armbands had expired. 8 Through their
fathers, the children filed an action in federal district court seeking
injunctive relief prohibiting school officials from disciplining them. 9
The local federal district court determined that wearing an armband to
express a political viewpoint was a means of expression protected by the
First Amendment's free speech clause. 10 The court nonetheless upheld
the school policy because it was not unreasonable to anticipate that the
wearing of the armbands would create a disturbance of some type.' 1
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in a 4-4 decision affirmed the
district court's ruling without an opinion. 12 The Supreme Court, Justice
Fortas delivering the opinion of the Court, reversed both courts, recog-
nizing that the wearing of armbands in the circumstances of this case was
"closely akin to 'pure speech.""13
The Tinker Court began its analysis by characterizing the issue be-
fore it as the murky area where "students in the exercise of First Amend-
ment rights collide with the rules of the school authorities." 14 On the
student side, the Court recognized its "unmistakable holding . . . for
almost fifty years" that students do not "shed their constitutional rights
to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate."1 5 On the
school side, the Court also reaffirmed the "comprehensive authority of
the states and of school officials, consistent with fundamental consti-
tutional safeguards, to prescribe and control conduct in the schools."16
After recognizing these principles, the Court concluded that wearing
armbands to school to express a political viewpoint clearly involved
6. Id.
7. Id. The school's principal felt that the presence of the armbands would disturb the regular
school activities even though the school had allowed students to wear other kinds of symbolic
messages. Id. at 510. In fact, students had been permitted to wear political campaigns buttons, and
some had worn Iron Crosses to school, the traditional Nazi symbol. Id.
8. Id. at 504.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 504-05.
11. Id. at 505.
12. Id.
13. Id. The Court concluded that "the wearing of armbands in the circumstances of this case was
entirely divorced from actually or potentially disruptive conduct by those participating in it. It was
closely akin to 'pure speech' which, we have repeatedly held, is entitled to comprehensive protection
under the First Amendment." Id. at 505-06.
14. Id. at 507.
15. Id. at 506.
16. Id. at 507.
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"direct, primary First Amendment rights akin to 'pure speech.""17
Before the Court resolved the conflict between the students and school
officials, it laid out some foundational principles. First, the Court
recognized that students, both in and out of school, are "persons" under
the Constitution.18 Second, students "are possessed of fundamental
rights which the State must respect[.]" 19 Based upon these two major
premises, the Court stated that "in the absence of a specific showing of
constitutionally valid reasons to regulate their speech, students are
entitled to freedom of expression of their view." 20
Once the Court concluded that students were afforded the consti-
tutional protection of free speech, it established a test to determine when
school regulations infringed upon a student's First Amendment rights.
Specifically, the Court held: 1) the State must have "more than a mere
desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness [of] an unpopular
viewpoint";21 and 2) the school regulation can infringe only where the
forbidden conduct would "materially and substantially interfere" with
the work of the school or impinge on the rights of other students. 22 The
Court decided that where facts are not demonstrated which might reason-
ably lead school authorities to forecast material and substantial dis-
ruption of school activities, a rule prohibiting the wearing of armbands
could not be sustained. 23
Turning to the facts of the case, the Tinker Court determined that
the banning of armbands was directed only at the Tinkers' viewpoint be-
cause school officials had not prevented students from wearing Iron
Crosses or political buttons on previous occasions. 24 The Court found
the banning of a singular viewpoint particularly offensive to the First
Amendment. 25 The Court also asserted that the record did not "demon-
strate any facts which might reasonably have led school officials to
forecast substantial disruption of or material interference with school
activities[.]" 26 Rather, the Tinkers' conduct was "a silent, passive expres-
17. Id. at 508.
18. Id. at 511.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 508-09.
22. Id. at 514.
23. Id. In discussing what level of protection such speech is afforded, Justice Fortas first re-
viewed the importance of the interaction between the Constitution and public.schools. He found that
"[t]he vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of
American schools. The classroom is peculiarly the market place of ideas." Id. at 512 (quoting
Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1965)).
24. Id. at 510-12.
25. Id. at 510-11.
26. Id. at 514.
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sion of opinion, unaccompanied by any disorder or disturbance[.]" 2 7
Finding that any disruption resulting from the wearing of the armbands
was minimal, the Court ruled that the Tinkers' form of expression was
afforded all of the protections of the First Amendment. 28
The Court's discussion of two Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals cases
demonstrates its acknowledgment that these case are highly fact-specific.
The Court cited two factually similar Fifth Circuit cases which reached
opposite results due to the presence or lack of material or substantial in-
terruption with school activities.2 9 The discussion of these cases demon-
strates the Court's particular focus on the results or effect of the form of
student expression. 30 The essence of the Tinker holding is that if a stu-
dent's expressive activity does not materially disrupt the school environ-
ment, deference will be given to the student's First Amendment rights.
However, if the expressive activity materially disrupts the school environ-
ment, school officials will be given broad authority to restore order. The
key point is that the focus of the First Amendment analysis is on the
result or effect of student expression.
II. THE SUPREME COURT CHANGES ITS FOCUS IN FRASER
"The next major post mark in the evolution of student speech oc-
curred in 1986 in Bethel School District Number 403 v. Fraser,"3 1 a 7-2
decision in favor of the school district. Focusing its attention primarily
on the content of the student's expression, the Fraser Court held that
school officials can punish a student for "offensively lewd and inde-
cent" speech in the schoolhouse. 32 Matthew Fraser was a student at
Bethel High School in Pierce County, Washington. 33 He delivered a
nominating speech for a fellow student for a student office at a voluntary
assembly.3 4 The assembly was held during school hours as part of a
27. Id. at 508.
28. Id. at 508-09, 514.
29. In Burnside v. Byers, 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966), students were disciplined for wearing free-
dom buttons. The Fifth Circuit held that the students could not be disciplined for wearing the buttons
because they caused no disruption to the school environment. Burnside, 363 F.2d at 746. However, in
Blackwell v. Issaquena Cty. Bd. of Ed., 363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966), the students who wore freedom
buttons harassed the students who chose not to wear buttons, thereby disrupting school activities. As
such, school officials were justified in regulating the wearing of the buttons.
30. See Vacca & Hudgins, Jr., supra note 4, at 3 (stating that the Justices paid scant attention to
the content of the speech; rather, they relied on the test of what happened because of the speech. Find-
ing that any disruption or disturbance resulting from the wearing of armbands was minimal, the
Supreme Court ruled that students were within their rights under the First Amendment for engaging in
the questionable speech).
31. 478 U.S. 675 (1986) (quoting Vacca & Hudgins, supra note 2, at 4).
32. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986).
33. Id. at 677.
34. Id.
682 [VOL. 74:679
FREE SPEECH AT THE SCHOOLHOUSE GATE
school-sponsored educational program in self-government and was
attended by approximately 600 students, many of who were fourteen
years old.35 The entire speech included references to his candidate in
terms of elaborate, graphic, and explicit sexual metaphors. 36 During the
speech, some of the students hooted and yelled, some mimicked the sexu-
al activities alluded to in the speech, and others appeared embarrassed. 37
The next morning, the assistant principal called Fraser into her
office and told him that his speech violated the school's "disruptive-
conduct" rule. 38 This rule prohibited conduct that substantially inter-
fered with the educational process, but included a provision prohibiting
the use of obscene or profane language or gestures. 39 Fraser admitted
that he deliberately used sexual innuendo in his speech.4 0 He was sus-
pended for three days and was told that his name would be removed
from the list of candidates for graduation speakers.4 1 The school dis-
trict's grievance procedures resulted in affirmance of the disciplinary
action. However, Fraser was allowed to return to school after only two
days of suspension. 42 Fraser's father filed suit on Fraser's behalf in
federal district court, alleging that the sanctions violated the First Amend-
ment and that the school rule was unconstitutionally vague and over-
broad.43 The district court agreed and enjoined the school district from
preventing Fraser from speaking at graduation and awarded monetary
relief.44 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the
speech was indistinguishable from the protest armbands in Tinker.4 5 The
Supreme Court reversed. 46
The Fraser Court began its analysis by reaffirming Tinker's caveat
that public school students "do not 'shed their constitutional rights to
35. Id.
36. Id. at 677-78. The relevant portion of Fraser's speech is as follows:
I know a man who is firm-he's firm in his pants, he's firm in his shirt, his character is
firm-but most ... of all, his belief in you, the students of Bethel, is firm. Jeff Kuhlman
is a man who takes his point and pounds it in. If necessary, he'll take an issue and nail it
to the wall. He doesn't attack things in spurts-he drives hard, pushing and pushing until
finally-he succeeds. Jeff is a man who will go to the very end-even the climax, for
each and every one of you. So vote for Jeff for A.S.B. vice-president-he'll never
come between you and the best our high school can be.
Id. at 687.
37. Id. at 677-78.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 678-79.
43. Id. at 679.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 680.
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freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate."' 47 However,
the Fraser Court also noted the "marked distinction between the political
'message' of the armbands in Tinker and the sexual content of [Fras-
er's] speech[.]" 48 The Court emphasized that the student's message in
Tinker involved the advocation of a particular political viewpoint. 49 The
Court determined that Fraser's speech was not intended to espouse a
particular political viewpoint; rather, the speech was "vulgar and lewd"
and therefore did not warrant Tinker's degree of First Amendment
protection. 50
The Court then addressed the issue of what level of First
Amendment protection was appropriate for Fraser's speech. In so
doing, the Court noted that Fraser's First Amendment rights must be
balanced against "society's countervailing interest in teaching students
the boundaries of socially appropriate behavior." 51 The Court reasoned
that students in public school do not have the "same latitude" to use
offensive language as adults, 52 and "the constitutional rights of students
in public schools are not automatically coextensive with the rights of
adults in other settings." 53 The Court then analogized Fraser's speech
with Ginsburg v. New York 54 and FCC v. Pacifica,55 in which the Court
concluded that a state may restrict vulgar but not legally obscene speech
47. Id. (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1968)).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 680.
50. Id. at 681-82.
51. Id. at 681. Specifically, the Court stated:
These fundamental values of "habits and manners of civility" essential to a democratic
society must, of course, include tolerance of divergent political and religious views, even
when the views expressed may be unpopular. But these "fundamental values" must also
take into account consideration of the sensibilities of others, and in the case of a school,
the sensibilities of fellow students.
Id.
52. Id. at 682. The Court quoted with approval the statement that "the First Amendment gives a
high school student the classroom right to wear Tinker's armband, but not Cohen's jacket." Id.
(quoting Thomas v. Board of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1057 (2nd Cir. 1979)) (Newman, J., concurring)
(referring to Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), in which the Court overturned a conviction
based on the wearing of a jacket with the slogan "F[---] the Draft")).
53. Id. at 682. The Court pointed to New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340-42 (1985) for
support. The T.LO. case interpreted the Fourth Amendment in the context of public schools. T.L.O.,
469 U.S. at 327. The T.L.O. Court held school officials to a lesser standard than that applied to police
officers, granting school officials wide latitude to conduct student searches on school grounds. Id. at
340, 343. Although it was a search and seizure case, T.L.O. was a strong indication that the Court
would take a more conservative view of First Amendment rights in the public school context.
54. 390 U.S. 629, 638 (1968) (upholding a state statute banning the sale of sexually oriented
material to minors, even though the material in question was entitled to First Amendment protection
with respect to adults).
55. 438 U.S. 726, 732 (1978),(upholding an FCC decision to a ban a comedian's monologue
described as "indecent but not obscene," in part because the monologue was "broadcast at a time
when children were undoubtedly in the audience.").
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which is directed at children. 56 Focusing on the fact that Fraser's speech
was vulgar and lewd, as opposed to disruptive, and directed at a young
audience, the Court held that the "School District acted entirely within
its permissible authority in imposing sanctions upon Fraser because
construing the First Amendment to permit vulgar and lewd speech . . .
would undermine the school's basic educational mission." 57
The Tinker Court made it clear that the constitutional protection
afforded to student expression hinges on its results or effect and not so
much on its content. 58 When wearing armbands did not materially or
substantially disrupt school activities or affect other students' rights, the
Tinker Court held that students had the right to engage in symbolic
speech. 59 However, the Fraser Court took a different approach. 60 Al-
though there was disagreement over the effect of Fraser's speech, some
degree of disturbance did occur.61 However, the effect or result of the
speech was not the focus of the First Amendment analysis. Rather, it was
the content of the student expression. 62
Justice Brennan concurred in the judgment, but not with the majori-
ty's analysis because he found it "difficult to believe" that Fraser's
speech was obscene or vulgar. 63 Justice Brennan concluded that Fraser's
language was "far removed from the very narrow class of 'obscene'
speech which the Court has held is not protected by the First Amend-
ment." 64 Justice Brennan did concur with the majority because he be-
lieved that under the circumstances of the case, the "school officials did
not violate the First Amendment in determining that [Fraser] should be
disciplined for the disruptive language he used while addressing a high
school assembly." 65 In other words, Fraser's speech was not entitled to
constitutional protection because it came under Tinker's "material or
substantial disruption" test, and not because his speech fell into the
constitutionally unprotected category "vulgar" or "lewd" expression.
Justice Brennan's concurrence clearly exposes the Fraser majority's
shift away from the Tinker "material or substantial disruption" analysis.
56. Fraser, 478 U.S. 684-85.
57. Id.
58. Vacca & Hudgins, supra note 2, at 6. Although the speech's effect on the audience was
briefly examined, the Fraser Court's focus was clearly the content of the speech. Indeed, the Court's
opinion focused primarily on the speech's content, the age of the audience, and the fact that the
speech was given in a public school. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683-84.
59. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 687 (Brennan, J., concurring).
64. Id. at 688.
65. Id. at 690.
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III. THE SUPREME COURT DECIDES HAZELWOOD
Two years later, the Rehnquist Court by a 5-3 vote, decided Hazel-
wood v. Kuhlmeier.66 Hazelwood involved the censorship of student
newspaper articles which were neither lewd nor legally obscene. The
Court, finding that a school-sponsored student newspaper is not a public
forum for indiscriminate student use, upheld the prerogative of edu-
cators to exercise editorial control over the contents of a high school
newspaper produced as part of the school's journalism curriculum. 67
The Spectrum was a newspaper written and edited by the Journalism
II class at Hazelwood East High School. 68 The Board of Education
allocated funds for the printing of the newspaper and the Journalism
teacher was the newspaper's adviser.69 The practice at Hazelwood dur-
ing the 1983 spring semester was to submit page proofs to the principal
for his review prior to publication. 70 When the proofs of the May 13
edition were reviewed by the principal, he objected to two articles. 7 ' One
of the stories described three students' experiences with pregnancy, and
the other discussed the impact of divorce on Hazelwood students. 72
The principal was concerned that the identity of the pregnant girls
might be ascertained from the article, that the article's references to
sexual activity were inappropriate for younger students, and that the
divorcing parents should have been given an opportunity to respond.73
Believing that there was no time to make changes in the articles before
the printing deadline, the principal directed the two pages containing the
stories on pregnancy and divorce be withheld from publication. 74 Three
student staff members of the Spectrum commenced an action in federal
district court against the school district, seeking a declaration that their
First Amendment rights had been violated.75
The federal district court held that the school could impose re-
straints on students' speech in activities that are "an integral part of the
school's education function" so long as their decision has "a substantial
and reasonable basis." 76 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed,
holding that the Spectrum was not only part of the school curriculum,
66. 484 U.S. 258 (1988).
67. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 258, 273 (1988).
68. Id. at 262.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 263.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 264.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 264-65.
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but a public forum because it was intended to be a conduit for student
viewpoint. 77 The Eighth Circuit concluded that the school could not cen-
sor articles except "when necessary to avoid material and substantial
interference with school work or discipline ... or the rights of others." 78
The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals decision and held that
the Spectrum was not a "public forum," but rather part of the
educational curriculum and a regular classroom activity. 79
The Hazelwood Court began its analysis by again reaffirming the
Tinker caveat that "[s]tudents in public schools do not 'shed their con-
stitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse
gate."' 80 The Court also reaffirmed the Fraser caveat that the "First
Amendment rights of students in the public schools 'are not auto-
matically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings."'81 As it
did in Fraser, the Court then proceeded to distinguish Hazelwood from
Tinker. The first issue Justice White addressed was whether the "Spec-
trum may appropriately be characterized as a forum for public expres-
sion." 82 The Court found traditional public forums are created within a
public school only if school officials have "'by policy or practice"'
opened the school to either the general public or some segment of the
general public, like student organizations. 83 Finding that the Spectrum
was part of the school's journalism course and the journalism teacher
exercised considerable discretion over the class, the Court concluded that
school officials had reserved the forum for its intended purpose as a
supervised learning experience for the students. 84 Therefore, the Court
held that the school-sponsored newspaper was not a public forum, and as
such was subject to reasonable restrictions by school administrators. 85
The primary distinction the Court drew between Tinker and Hazel-
wood was the difference between a school-sponsored activity and a non-
school-sponsored activity. While Tinker involved a school's toleration of
"particular student speech," Hazelwood addressed the "affirmative pro-
77. Id. at 265.
78. Id. (citing Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 795 F.2d 1368, 1372 (8th Cir. 1986)).
79. Id. at 270, 273-74 (citing Kuhlmeier, 795 F.2d at 1372).
80. Id. at 266 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Community Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506
(1968)).
81. Id. (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986)). The Court also
noted that "[a] school need not tolerate student speech that is inconsistent with 'its basic educational
mission' . . . even though the government could not censor similar speech outside the school." Id.
(citing Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685).
82. Id. at 267.
83. See id. (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 47 (1983);
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981)).
84. Id. at 268-71.
85. Id. at 270.
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mot[ion] [of] particular student speech." 86 Since the student expression
occurred in a school-sponsored forum and was affirmatively promoted
by the school, the newspaper was not afforded the same level of First
Amendment protection as the armbands in Tinker.87 Therefore, school
officials may "exercis[e] editorial control over the style and content of
student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities as long as their
actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns." 88
Justice Brennan filed a strong dissent, arguing that the majority's
"non school-sponsored" and "school-sponsored" distinction for grant-
ing different levels of constitutional protection to student expression was
not justified. 89 He reasoned that a distinction was not required because
the Tinker test sufficiently encompassed all student speech within a
public school. 90 A different standard was not necessary because, under
the Tinker standard, school officials would still have control over student
speech in school-sponsored activities because student speech is mani-
festly "more likely to disrupt a curricular activity-one that is 'designed
to teach' something-than when it arises in the context of noncurricular
activity." 9 1 Justice Brennan argued that by disregarding Tinker's
analysis, the majority created a "taxonomy of school censorship." 92
Hazelwood arguably marked further restrictions on students' First
Amendment rights in the public schools. The Hazelwood majority gave
broad authority to school principals to look away from the results or ef-
fect of speech and to determine "whether to disseminate student speech
on potentially sensitive topics," 93 when the medium of the student
expression is through a school-sponsored activity, and school officials
deem the message to be inconsistent with a school's basic educational
mission. It was clear by the beginning of the 1990s that school officials
could limit speech and expression that: 1) materially disrupted the
86. Id. at 270-71. The Court stated:
The [Tinker] question addresses educators' ability to silence a student's personal
expression that happens to occur on the school premises. The Hazelwood question
concerns educators' authority over school-sponsored publications, theatrical productions,
and other expressive activities that students, parents, and members of the public might
reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school.
Id. at 271.
87. Id. at 270.
88. Id. at 273.
89. Id. at 281. "The Court does not, for it cannot, purport to discern from our precedents the
distinction it creates." Id.
90. Id. at 283.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 281. Justice Brennan stated "mere incompatibility with the school's pedagogical mes-
sage [is not] constitutionally sufficient justification for the suppression of student speech." Id. at 280.
Under the Constitution, "public educators must accommodate some student expression even if it
offends them or offers views or values that contradict those the school wishes to inculcate." Id.
93. Id. at 272.
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educational environment; 2) was vulgar or offensive; or 3) carried the
school's official imprimatur.
I. CONCLUSION
Since the Tinker decision, the Supreme Court has progressively
narrowed students' First Amendment rights to freedom of expression in
public schools. Seemingly, once student expression falls outside the cate-
gory of political speech, school administrators are given broad authority
to look away from the effect of the student expression and instead to
regulate based on the content of the expression. Under Fraser, the line
between "vulgar and lewd" expression and constitutionally protected
speech is arguably blurred. 94 Fraser marked the Court's increasing
deference to school authorities categorizing student expression as "vul-
gar" or "lewd." When student expression is deemed to be vulgar or
lewd, as opposed to disruptive, a school is acting "entirely within its per-
missible authority in imposing sanctions" because construing the First
Amendment to permit such speech "would undermine the school's
basic educational mission."95 Under Hazelwood, any student speech ex-
pressed through the medium of a school-sponsored activity is subject to
regulation as long as the regulation is "reasonably related to legitimate
pedagogical concerns." 96 Thus, even political or other nonvulgar ex-
pression appears to be subjected to administrative regulation if it is ex-
pressed through a school-sponsored activity. Clearly, since Fraser and
Hazelwood, the constitutional protection of student expression in our
public schools today is far less than what it was afforded when Justice
Fortas found that "[t]he vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is
nowhere more vital than in the community of American schools. The
classroom is peculiarly the market place of ideas."97
94. Justice Brennan found it "difficult to believe" that Fraser's nomination speech was obscene
or vulgar. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 687 (1986) (Brennan, J., concurring).
Indeed, Justice Brennan felt that Fraser's speech was "far removed from the very narrow class of
,obscene' speech which the Court has held is not protected by the First Amendment." Id. at 688.
95. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 684-85.
96. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273.
97. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512 (1986) (quoting Keyishian v.
Board. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1965)).
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